CIVIL PROCEDURE: FINDINGS IN CIVIL
ACTION NOT RES JUDICATA IN SUBSEQUENT LONGSHOREMAN'S ACT CLAIM
In Young & Co. v. Shea' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ruled that the judicial doctrine of collateral estoppel will not be
applied to findings of fact made by a jury in a prior civil action when
the same issue later arises before a deputy commissioner under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.2 The
claimant longshoreman, Tugwell, had previously instituted a civil
action against a shipowner based upon the traditional tort theory of
negligence and the unseaworthiness doctrine.' The shipowner
impleaded the stevedoring firm of Young & Co., Tugwell's employer.
In response to a special interrogatory,4 the jury found that Tugwell
had not been involved in an accident and had not suffered an injury,
and judgment was accordingly entered for the shipowner. Tugwell
then instituted proceedings under the Longshoremen's Act to recover
compensation from Young & Co. for the alleged injury. Over the
employer's objection, the Commission refused to apply the doctrine of
collateral estoppel; found that Tugwell had sustained the injury as
claimed; and awarded compensation. The employer appealed, arguing
that the Commissioner had erred in failing to apply the previous
judicial determination that Tugwell had not been injured, and that the
prior action should collaterally estop Tugwell from again asserting
the same injury as the basis of a workmen's compensation claim. Both
the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.
Collateral estoppel is that aspect of res judicata which precludes
relitigation of specific facts or issues once those questions have been
judicially determined.' Generally, the application of the doctrine is
'397 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1968).
2 33 U.S.C. § 901-50 (1964).

'Tugwell v. A.F. Klaveness & Co., 320 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 951
(1964).
4 Id. at 868 n.1.
See generally Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94
U.S. 351 (1876); Peckham v. Family Loan Co., 196 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1952); F. JAiES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 11.9 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 45, comment c (1942); Scott,
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limited to those facts which were finally and necessarily determined in
the prior action. 6 This limitation, with its underlying rationale of
judicial expediency and efficiency, is based upon the principle that
every man is entitled to his day in court, but that he shall not be heard
a second time on an issue which he has already been permitted to
contest.7 There are three criteria which must be satisfied before the
doctrine of collateral estoppel will be applied. These include whether
the fact or issue determined in the prior action is identical with the
question presented in the present action;' whether the party against
whom the doctrine is pleaded was a party to, or in privity with a party
to, the prior action; 9 and whether the issue in question was
conclusively and necessarily determined in the prior action.'" When
these criteria are met, the doctrine applies and factual determinations
made in the prior action are accepted as binding upon a court in any
subsequent proceeding.
Collateral estoppel, essentially a judicial doctrine applying only to
bodies exercising a judicial function," has been less consistently
applied in the field of administrative law than it has in strictly judicial
areas." Thus, administrative invocation of the doctrine depends upon
the purpose and function of the agency before which a hearing is being
conducted. It does not apply to those agencies or boards whose
functions are primarily legislative or regulatory.' 3 The distinction
between those agencies which are judicial, or "quasi-judicial," and
hence subject to the doctrine, however, and those which are essentially
ministerial is a difficult one to draw. A "quasi-judicial"
administrative agency is one empowered to ascertain facts from
Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942); Developments in the Law-Res
Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV. 818 (1952); 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 522 (1961).
6 See, e.g., F. JAMES, supranote 5, at §§ 11.19 -. 21.

'See, e.g., Masterson v. Atherton, 328 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Burch, 294
F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1961); Worley v. Dunn, 252 F.2d 712 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 848
(1958); Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 937 (1957); Wallingsford v. Larcon Co., 237 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1956).
' See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
' See, e.g., F. JAMES, supra note 5.
" See, e.g., id., at § 11.18; Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of PriorLitigation, 39 IOWA
L. REV. 217 (1954).
"See, e.g., Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. &S.F.Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (193 1).
" See, e.g., 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 545 (1958); Groner &Sternstein, Res Judicata
in Federal Administrative Law, 39 IowA L. REV. 300 (1954); Parker, Administrative Res
Judicata, 40 ILL. L. REV. 56 (1945); Comment, Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 49 YALE
L.J. 1250 (1940).
" See, e.g., Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. &S.F.Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1931).
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evidence and to apply the law to the facts through the use of judicial
discretion.' 4 The actions of such agencies usually take the form of
fines, restrictions or positive orders directing affirmative action on the
part of the losing party. Workmen's compensation boards and labor
relations boards are examples. Agencies whose functions are
primarily ministerial or legislative are those which, like the FTC,
ICC, IRS and Patent Office, confine their judgments to prospective
regulations, tariff limits, allowable tax deductions and the like.'" It
has frequently been held that a court is bound by collateral estoppel to
the prior findings of an administrative agency. Thus, in Drier v.
Randforce Amusement Corp.,'6 a case presenting the converse of the
situation posed in Young & Co., the finding of a workmen's
compensation board that Drier had suffered no injury was held to
estop Drier from alleging the same injury in a subsequent tort action
against his employer. When, as in Young & Co., the administrative
proceeding arises after a judicial determination, the applicability of
the doctrine would seem to be influenced by a balancing of the
legislative intent and purpose of the administrative tribunal against
judicial expediency and fairness to the individual litigants. In those
cases in which it is felt that an adverse administrative ruling would
work undue hardship on a party whose status has already been
judicially determined, collateral estoppel is applied.'7 In other cases,
the policy factors governing the origin and powers of the agency are
found to take precedence over the policy considerations upon which
collateral estoppel is based.' In New York State Labor Relations
Board v. Holland Laundry,'9 for instance, an employer who had
already been adjudged correct and within the law in a labor dispute
was ordered to reinstate striking workers by the state labor relations
"See, e.g., Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944); County Farm Bureau v. Board of
Supervisors, 218 Iowa 937, 252 N.W. 498 (1934); Pennsylvania R.R. v. State Aviation
Comm'n, 2 N.J. 64, 65 A.2d 61 (1949); Dunbar v. Fant, 170 S.C. 414, 170 S.E. 460 (1933);
Kirby Lumber Co. v. Adams, 62 S.W.2d 366 (rex. Civ. App. 1933).
"See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry. 284 U.S. 370 (1931).
1614 Misc. 2d 362, 179 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1958). See also Westgate-Sun Harbor Co. v.
Watson, 206 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
"See, e.g., Bennett v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1940); George H. Lee Co. v.
FTC, 113 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1940).
"See, e.g., K. DAvis, supra note 12, at § 18.11. See generally Slocum v. Delaware, L. &
W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950) (dictum); Miller v. Railroad Comm'r, 9 Cal. 2d 190, 70 P.2d 164
(1937); Williams Mfg. Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 135 (1938).
"1294 N.Y. 480, 63 N.E.2d 68 (1945). For a detailed analysis of this case see Jaffe, The Public
Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases,59 HARV L. REv. 720 (1946).
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board. The board refused to abide by the facts as previously judicially
determined. In upholding the board's action, although reversing the
reinstatement order, the court held that the policy considerations
served by res judicata were not equal in weight with the public interest
served by the labor relations board. No prior determinations of fact, it
said, should prevent the board from making its own investigation in
the public interest.
After first noting that Young & Co. presented a situation where
collateral estoppel would normally be applied, the court proceeded to
recognize two factors involved in the subsequent administrative
hearing which precluded application of the doctrine. Of primary
importance to the court was the level of proof necessary to establish a
claim under the Act. The court concluded that a "less stringent
standard of persuasion""0 is needed to establish a fact before a
commissioner than is necessary to prove the identical fact before a
jury. Finding an analogous situation in the different burdens of
persuasion carried by the parties in criminal and civil actions, the
court reasoned that failure to prove the injury in a civil proceeding
should not preclude subsequent efforts to establish the same injury
before a commissioner, any more than should failure to prove a
criminal act prevent an attempt to recover for tortious conduct. The
court was unable to ascribe a legal label to the burden before a
commissioner but was satisfied that it was lighter. The civil-criminal
analogy and the statutory policy of resolving all doubtful questions of
fact in favor of the employee provided the major premise of the court's
logic. The second factor leading to the court's conclusion was the
underlying policy of workmen's compensation laws. It is the policy of
the Act, the court noted, to place the burden of loss upon those best
able to bear it. Having failed to convince a jury, Tugwell still had
access to the statutory remedy provided by the Act, and the court
could find nothing that would operate to deny this recourse in light of
the duality of remedies envisioned by Congress."
The importance of Young & Co. lies in the fact that for the first
time the lower quantum of proof required to establish a workmen's
compensation claim before a commissioner has been held to be, in
itself, a bar to the defensive plea of collateral estoppel when that plea
20397 F.2d at 188.
21See, e.g., Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.

85, 100 (1946).
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is made by a party who has prevailed in prior civil litigation.
However, the fact that the case arose in a workmen's compensation
setting should perhaps be viewed as limiting both the decision and the
import of the burden of proof consideration. The difference in the
burden of proof before a civil court and an administrative tribunal is
necessarily an uncertain concept-one that defies clear verbalization.
It has even been suggested that there is no real difference between the
two.2" The court, however, was able to buttress the unsteady
framework of the burden of proof concept by invoking the policy
considerations of the Compensation Act. As was the Holland
Laundry court, 3 the Young court was undoubtedly conscious of the
public interest in assuring that any injured employee receives some
form of insurance compensation, almost regardless of the employer's
culpability. Such strong policy considerations do not necessarily
pervade other areas of administrative law, and the court itself was
careful to mention that the policies of the Longshoremen's Act are not
necessarily applicable in other settings. 4 This observation, made in
reference to cases involving, among others, the FTC and IRS, implies
that at least in these areas, the policy considerations of collateral
estoppel may prevail. The Young & Co. decision, therefore, should be
confined to the context in which the case arose. An attempt to extend
it beyond the workmen's compensation area would more than likely
be rejected as an unwarranted interference with established principles
of collateral estoppel.

22

23

Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm'n, 221 Md. 221, 156 A.2d 657 (1959).
See note 19 supra.

2 397 F.2d at 188 n.

i.

